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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 880034 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Rule 35, 
U.R.A.P. The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court which gives rise to 
this Petition for Rehearing was filed on June 28, 1991. On July 
10, 1991, pursuant to Fire Insurance Exchange's Rule 22(b) and (c), 
U.R.A.P., Motion for Extension of Time for Filing Petition for 
Rehearing, this Court ordered that Fire Insurance Exchange had 
until July 26, 1991, to file its Petition for Rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
On remand to the trial court, is Fire Insurance Exchange 
entitled to a trial by jury on the issue of punitive damages? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and Article I, Sections 7 and 10 of the Utah Constitution are 
deemed determinative of this Petition for Rehearing. Due to the 
length of these provisions, the text of each is set forth fully in 
the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to seek further 
consideration and clarification from this Court of certain issues 
decided in this Courtfs published opinion in Crookston, et al. v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, Docket No. 880034, dated June 28, 1991 
(hereinafter "Crookston"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court's opinion in Crookston, and the briefs previously 
filed by plaintiffs/appellees and defendant/appellant contain a 
full statement of the pertinent facts on appeal. 
Subsequent to the issuance of this Court's opinion in 
Crookston, Fire Insurance Exchange has tendered to plaintiffs the 
sum of $1,489,26 3.14, in full and complete satisfaction of the 
compensatory damages, attorneys1 fees, and costs awarded at the 
trial level and affirmed on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court's opinion in Crookston correctly notes that the 
jury's award of $4.0 million in punitive damages exceeds the 
"bounds of the general pattern" of prior punitive damage awards in 
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the state of Utah, and was the result of a "highly problematic", 
"incomprehensively vague and unintelligible", and "essentially 
standardless" formula for awarding such damages. In vacating the 
trial courtfs denial of Fire Insurance Exchange's motion for new 
trial or remittitur on the basis of an excessive award of punitive 
damages and remanding the case for "further consideration" in light 
of the Courtfs opinion, this Court failed to require that the issue 
of punitive damages be retried under the standards and procedures 
adopted in Crookston. Notions of due process and right to a trial 
by jury require this Court to order the retrial of the issue of 
punitive damages before a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ORIGINAL $4.0 MILLION PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
AWARD RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL JURY'S 
ESSENTIALLY STANDARDLESS DISCRETION. 
This Court in Crookston acknowledges that the unprecedented 
$4.0 million punitive damage award in this case "exceeds the 
general pattern" established in prior Utah cases. Id. at 25. In 
Crookston, this Court also notes that the juryfs award may have 
been the result of the jury's "essentially standardless discretion" 
in assessing the amount of damages awardable against Fire Insurance 
Exchange. Id. at 27. In vacating the trial court!s order denying 
Fire Insurance Exchange's motion for new trial or remittitur on the 
issue of punitive damages, this Court made the following 
observations as to the deficiencies in the punitive damage 
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"standard" utilized by the trial jury in the first instance in this 
case: 
"[A] review of our case law and punitive damages 
has left us dissatisfied with articulated standards 
for determining the amount of such awards." Id. at 
25. 
"These standards provide little guidance for . . . 
a jury fixing the punitive damages . . .." Id. 
"The stated list of factors we have said must be 
considered in assessing the amount of punitives to 
be awarded include the following . . . . Our cases 
have done little more than list these factors. No 
relative weights have been assigned them, and no 
standards or formulas have been established for 
properly evaluating them when making an award or 
when reviewing the propensity of a jury award. 
This makes such an enterprise highly problematic 
for judge and jury. The finder of fact has no 
guidance on how much weight to give each factor or 
even how the factors should be assessed. And 
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial court 
that there is any sort of limit or ceiling on an 
award." Id. at 26. 
ff[Q]uite predictably, the bases for awards made in 
those jurisdictions [utilizing similar lists of 
factors] are no more fathomable than ours. The 
problem that results from this lack of guidance to 
juries . . . is exemplified by disparate ratios of 
punitive to actual damages . . .." Id. 
[T]he standard by which the jury is to gauge the 
amount of punitive damages, if any, that it is to 
award is incomprehensibly vague and unintelligible 
. . .." IcL at 27 (quoting Charter Hospital of 
Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So.2d 909, 916-17 
(Ala. 1990)). 
"Many states have recognized the problems created 
by giving finders of fact essentially standardless 
discretion to award punitive damages . . .." Id. 
at 27. 
The obvious deficiencies in the standards for assessing 
punitive damages utilized by the trial jury in this case compelled 
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this Court to "craft" a set of new guidelines for awarding punitive 
damages. 1x3. at 25. In adopting such guidelines, this Court 
adopted a "middle ground" approach, rather than continuing to rely 
solely on the traditional "list-of-factors standard." IcL at 28. 
The new standards mandated by this Court in Crookston place 
additional emphasis or clarification on the "reasonable and 
rational" relationship requirement between a punitive damage award 
and the actual "hard compensatory" damages. Id. at 29; 31-32 at n. 
29. This Court then articulated the following general standard to 
enable juries, trial courts, and appellate courts to know what is 
mandated under the "reasonable and rational relationship" 
requirement: 
Generally, we have found punitive damage 
awards below $100,000 not to be excessive only 
when the punitives do not exceed actual 
damages by more than a ratio of approximately 
3-to-l. (Citations omitted) 
Because of the limited number of cases 
considering large awards, it is more difficult 
to note a particular pattern once the award 
exceeds approximately $100,000. However, it 
is safe to say that these large awards appear 
to receive more scrutiny than the smaller 
awards and that the acceptable ratio appears 
lower. (Citations omitted) 
The general rule to be drawn from our past 
cases appears to be that where the punitives 
are well below $100,000, punitive damage 
awards beyond a 3-to-l ratio to actual damages 
have seldom been upheld and that where the 
award is in excess of $100,000, we have 
indicated some inclination to overturn awards 
having ratios of less than 3-to-l. 
Id. at 29-30. 
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In this case, the jury found $815,266 in compensatory damages, 
of which $323,399 represented "hard compensatory" damages. As a 
result, the jury's award of $4.0 million in punitive damages bears 
a more than 12-to-l ratio to the Crookstonsf "hard" damages, 
thereby clearly exceeding the "bounds of the general pattern" of 
punitive damage awards in the state of Utah. Not only does the 
ratio of punitive to actual damages in this case exceed the 
"general pattern," but the sheer size of the award, $4.0 million, 
is eight times the next highest published punitive damage award in 
the state of Utah. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P. 2d 766 (Utah 
1985) ($500,000 award). Such a significant departure from the 
"bounds of the general pattern," suggests strongly that a trial 
jury, if instructed in light of this Court's opinion in Crookston, 
would probably render a punitive damage verdict much different than 
that returned by the original jury. In contrast to the original 
jury which was ill equipped without any substantive and meaningful 
formula for properly evaluating the amount of punitive damages to 
be awarded, a new jury with the Crookston standards would be far 
more likely to render a punitive damage award which bears a 
reasonable and rational relationship to actual damages in this 
case. 
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II. 
REMANDING THIS CASE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, WITHOUT AN 
ACCOMPANYING RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY, WOULD 
VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF DUE 
PROCESS AND RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY* 
This Court's opinion in Crookston vacates the trial court's 
order denying the motion for new trial or remittitur on the issue 
of punitive damages, and further remands the case to the trial 
court "for further consideration in light of this opinion." Id. at 
34. The Court's opinion, however, does not clearly state what type 
of procedure the parties are entitled to in order to facilitate 
such "further consideration." Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully 
submits that constitutional notions of due process and right to 
trial by jury would be violated, absent a directive to the trial 
court to retry the issue of punitive damages to a jury utilizing 
the Crookston standards. 
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
guarantees the right of jury trial in civil cases: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, excepting capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A 
jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded. 
See also, International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor 
and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981). Likewise, both 
the federal and state constitutions prohibit the deprivation of 
property "without due process of law." United States Constitution, 
Amendment 14, Section 1; Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
Absent a directive to the trial court requiring a trial by 
jury to determine the amount of punitive damages to be assessed 
against Fire Insurance Exchange, the trial court may act 
individually to apply the new Crookston standards in passing 
judgment on the original jury's "standardless" based punitive 
award. Such a procedure would result in one trier of fact, having 
used one formula, albeit of dubious assistance and guidance, 
rendering a $4.0 million punitive award, and then the initial 
reviewer of the award, i.e., the trial judge, would be called upon 
to use the new standard articulated in Crookston to review and pass 
upon the appropriateness of the amount of the original award. In 
effect, such a procedure would deny Fire Insurance Exchange its 
right to have a jury apply the Crookston standards to the facts of 
this case. Likewise, such a procedure would seemingly deny Fire 
Insurance Exchange's right to procedural fairness and due process. 
For instance, on remand, absent a trial by jury, the trial court 
might sustain the $4.0 million punitive award, even though there is 
no evidence what the original jury may have awarded had it been 
given the Crookston standards. Fundamental fairness should 
preclude either the trial court or this Court from speculating as 
to what the original jury, or any other jury for that matter, would 
or would not do in awarding punitive damages consistent with the 
opinion in Crookston under the facts of this case. 
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The better procedure at this juncture is for this Court to 
simply vacate the punitive damage award and order a new trial on 
the issue of punitive damages. See Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, 
Inc., 702 P. 2d 98 (Utah 1985) (Court ordered new trial on issue of 
punitive damages on remand). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully 
requests that this Court order a new trial by jury on the issue of 
the amount of punitive damages to be assessed against Fire 
Insurance Exchange. To simply allow the trial court to use the 
Crookston standards to pass on a fatally flawed standardless jury 
award of punitive damages would effectively deny Fire Insurance 
Exchange's right to due^jkrocess and trial by jury. 
, 1991. 
Sc HANNI 
' Phillip 
Steepen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
200646nh 
DATED this 0*+»+<r day ofv 
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ADDENDUM 
Determinative Authorities A-l 
Crookston, et al. v. Fire Insurance Exchange, Docket 
No. 880034 A-2 
11 
Constitution of the United States Amend. XIV £1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, £10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, excepting capital 
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths 
of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
S. Larry Crookston, Randi L. 
Crookston, and Anna W. Drake, 
Trustee of the Estate of 
Spencer Larry Crookston and 
Randi Lynn Crookston, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
No. 880034 
F I L E D 
June 28, 1991 
v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, a 
California corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: L. Rich Humphreys, Francis M. Wikstrora, Salt Lake 
City, for appellees 
Philip R. Fishier, Stephen J. Trayner, Salt Lake 
City, and Frank A, Roybal, Bountiful, for appellant 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Fire Insurance Exchange ("Fire Insurance") appeals a 
jury verdict awarding Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn 
Crookston (collectively referred to as "the Crookstons") and 
Anna W. Drake, trustee of the Crookstons1 estate, compensa-
tory damages of $815,826 and punitive damages of $4,000,000 
on various theories arising out of Fire Insurances failure 
to pay in full a claim for property damage caused by the 
collapse of the Crookstons* home while under construction. 
Fire Insurance also appeals the trial court's award of 
$175,000 in attorney fees and $11,126 in costs to the 
Crookstons. 
The jury found that Fire Insurance breached its 
contract of insurance, including the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing recognized in Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress upon the Crookstons; committed 
fraud and misrepresentation in its handling of the 
Crookstons* claims; and was the proximate cause of the 
damages suffered by the Crookstons. Fire Insurance argues 
that myriad substantive and procedural errors were committed 
which require reversal of the verdict and/or the damage 
awards. We find no reason to reverse on the issue of Fire 
Insurance's liability. We also uphold the trial court's 
determination that the compensatory damages are supported by 
the evidence and well within the discretion of the jury. 
iHowever^ we vacate the trial court's denial of a motion for a 
i new trial on grounds that the punitive damage award was | excessive and remand for further consideration consistent 
f with this opinion. ~=-
On appeal/ we recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. E.g., State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116/ 117 (Utah 1989); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766/ 
769 (Utah 1985). Larry and Randi Crookston owned a vacant 
lot in Davis County/ Utah# on which they wanted to build an 
"earth" home# i.e./ a house constructed partially under-
ground to take advantage of the natural heating and cooling 
effects of the earth. In December of 1980, they approached 
Rocky Mountain State Bank for a construction loan in the 
amount of $60,000. The bank approved the loan with the 
stipulation that the Crookstons obtain insurance naming the 
bank as the loss payee. The Crookstons obtained such a 
policy from Fire Insurance with a maximum coverage of 
$67/000. The policy named the Crookstons as the insureds and 
the bank as the loss payee. 
In December of 1981/ the home/ which was 90 percent 
completed/ collapsed. The Crookstons filed a claim with Fire 
Insurance that month/ and an adjustor was assigned the 
claim. A few months passed during which no progress was made 
on the claim. The Crookstons then hired an attorney, Ralph 
Klemm, to represent them in the claim adjustment. Klemm 
assisted Fire Insurance in obtaining bids to have the home 
repaired. By the end of March of 1982/ Fire Insurance had 
received bids from two contractors: one in the amount of 
$50/951/ and another in the amount of $49,600. In April of 
1982/ Fire Insurances regional office extended settlement 
authority in, the amount of $49/443. In May of 1982/ the 
adjustor obtained another bid from an architect in the amount 
of $74/000. 
Later in May, Fire Insurance replaced the original 
adjustor with one more experienced. The new adjustor/ Alan 
Clapperton/ commissioned an engineer to do an analysis 
limited to structural damage. The engineer was not informed 
by Clapperton that his report would be the basis for a bid to 
reconstruct the house. Clapperton then requested a bid to 
rebuild the home from an inexperienced contractor. 
Clapperton provided this contractor with a copy of the 
engineer's analysis, representing that the engineer's limited 
analysis encompassed the entire damage to be repaired. On 
June 14/ 1982/ the contractor bid $27/830.60 to repair the 
Mn fl«0034 2 
home. Clapperton immediately made an appointment to meet 
with a bank officer on June 16th to discuss settlement. On 
the morning of the 16th, Clapperton received a call from 
Ralph Klemm, the Crookstons' attorney, asking about the 
status of any settlement. Clapperton told Klemm that he 
needed a little more time and would be getting back to him 
soon with a settlement proposal. Clapperton said nothing 
about the bid he had received two days earlier or of the 
meeting he had scheduled with the bank for later_£Jfcy*t same 
day. 
At the meeting with the bank, Clapperton did not 
disclose the fact that three other bids, all substantially 
higher, had been obtained, nor did he reveal that the 
$27,830.60 bid was based on an engineerfs appraisal limited 
to structural damage only. The bank officer agreed to settle 
for slightly more than $32,000, the amount of the low bid 
plus an approximation of the interest that had accrued on the 
Crookston loan since the collapse. Knowing full well that 
the $27,830.60 bid was substantially lower than any other 
bid, Clapperton insisted that the bank accept a settlement 
check made out only to the bank, not jointly to the bank and 
the Crookstons, and that the bank execute a proof of loss 
form releasing Fire Insurance from any further liability on 
the claim. The settlement was effected that same day, and 
all necessary documents were signed and exchanged. 
The Crookstonsf attorney called the bank later on 
June 16th. At that time, Klemm was told that the bank had 
just settled the claim with Fire Insurance. Klemm immedi-
ately called Clapperton, who affirmed that Fire Insurance had 
settled all claims under the policy with the sole loss payee, 
the bank. Clapperton also stated that the insureds, the 
Crookstons, did not have to be included in the settlement, 
that nothing more was owing, and that he was closing his file. 
Klemm called the bank and discussed the Crookstons* 
situation. He learned that the bank intended to pursue a 
deficiency claim against the Crookstons for the balance due 
on the $60,000 loan that was not paid by the insurance 
settlement. Because the Crookstons lacked the means to pay 
off the loan, the bank.threatened foreclosure. In order to 
avoid additional interest, attorney fees, and costs, the 
Crookstons deeded the property on which the earth home stood 
to the bank in lieu of foreclosure and then declared 
bankruptcy. 
In February of 1983, the Crookstons filed a suit 
against the bank and Fire Insurance. As the pleadings 
ultimately stood, the Crookstons alleged causes of action 
against Fire Insurance for breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation and 
fraud. Against the bank, the Crookstons asserted claims for 
breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach 
of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and fraud, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. They sought actual 
and punitive damages against both Fire Insurance and the 
bank. Fire Insurance and the bank cross-claimed against each 
other, asserting rights of contribution. 
In January of 1987, Fire Insurance moved for summary 
judgment based on a clause in the insurance contract requiring 
that any actions against the company be brought within one 
year of the date of loss. Fire Insurance argued that because 
the date of loss was December of 1981, when the house 
collapsed, and the action was brought fourteen months later, 
in February of 1983, the action should have been barred. The 
trial court denied the motion. Fire Insurance also moved to 
bifurcate the proceedings, requesting that the cause of 
action for breach of contract be separated from the remaining 
causes of action, which motion the trial court also denied. 
Five days before trial, on a Thursday afternoon, the 
Crookstons agreed to settle with the bank. The afternoon of 
the next day, a stipulation regarding the settlement was 
executed, and the bank served and filed a motion for summary 
judgment, seeking its dismissal from the action. This motion 
was granted. 
The case then proceeded to trial against Fire 
Insurance. After a six-day trial, the jury awarded $815,826 
in compensatory damages" and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. 
Although the jury's award of compensatory damages was not 
broken down further, testimony at trial attributed $323,399 
of the $815,826 to economic loss, making the remaining 
$492,427 apparently attributable to emotional distress and 
loss of financial reputation. Fire Insurance filed a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, or 
remittitur, which the court denied on December 30, 1987. On 
January 11, 1988, the court entered an additional judgment 
against Fire Insurance awarding the Crookstons attorney fees 
of $175,000 and expenses of $11,126. Fire Insurance then 
filed this appeal. 
Fire Insurance claims as follows: (i) the trial 
court erred in granting the bank's summary judgment motion, 
which was both procedurally and substantively flawed; 
(ii) the trial court erred in refusing to hold the action 
barred by the one-year limitation period in the policy; 
(iii) the jury instructions regarding fraud were erroneous; 
(iv) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of 
either intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud; 
(v) attorney fees should not have been awarded; and (vi) the 
compensatory and punitive damages were excessive under Utah 
law and also violated constitutional notions of due process 
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and the prohibition of excessive fines. We will address only 
the dispositive issues. 
Initially, we consider the claim that the trial 
court erred in granting the bank summary judgment on Fire 
Insurance's cross-claim for contribution. As noted earlier, 
after settling with the Crookstons, the bank filed a summary 
judgment motion four days prior to trial. In support of the 
motion, the bank made several arguments: (i) it should be 
dismissed from the case because it had settled wicn the 
Crookstons; (ii) it was abandoning any claim for contribution 
against Fire Insurance; and (iii) there was no legal basis 
upon which Fire Insurance could recover against the bank on 
its cross-claim for contribution because contribution is not 
available to one found to have committed an intentional tort 
or a breach of contract, the only two theories under which 
the Crookstons were then proceeding against Fire Insurance. 
The court held a hearing on the summary judgment 
motion on May 26, 1987, the Tuesday following the motionfs 
filing and the morning of trial, which was four calendar days 
but only one business day after the motion was filed with the 
court.1 At the time of the hearing, Fire Insurance had not 
filed any opposition papers* Fire Insurance argues that the 
court was incorrect on the law of contribution and that the 
summary judgment motion was procedurally flawed because it 
was filed late. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We first 
consider the procedural challenge. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires at least 
ten days' notice before a hearing on a motion for summary 
judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this case, only three 
days intervened between the filing of the motion and the 
hearing, two of which were weekend days and the other, a 
legal holiday. Obviously, a technical violation of rule 
56(c) occurred. Because a rule 56(c) violation does not 
divest the court of jurisdiction over the motion, see Walker 
v. Rockv Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 
P.2d 538, 541 (1973); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. 
Blomcruist. 29 Utah 2d 58, 61-62, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972), 
it has the power to grant summary judgment despite a rule 
56(c) violation. However, such a violation will void the 
grant unless the violation amounts to harmless error.2 £££ 
1. The intervening weekend was the Memorial Day weekend. 
2. Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals in Gillmoor v. 
Cumminas, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), reversed 
a grant of summary judgment holding that the trial court 
committed error when it ruled on the motion six days before 
the time to respond to the moving party's motion to strike 
supporting affidavits had expired, Gillmoor, however, even if 
accepted as an accurate statement of Utah law, is inapposite 
(Continued on page 6.) 
«; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Blomauist, 29 Utah 2d at 62, 504 P.2d at 
1021 (summary judgment upheld where time violation did not 
adversely affect defendant's rights). 
The harmless error analysis proceeds under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 613 and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1989).4 -Harmless error- is defined in Verde as an 
error that is -sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings.- Verde, 770 P.2d at~=£20; accord. 
e.g.. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987) 
(explaining meaning of -reasonable- probability or likeli-
hood). Put in other words, an error is harmful only if the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict. Knight, 734 P.2d at 
920. Our task, then, is to determine whether a different 
outcome on the summary judgment motion would have had a 
reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the case. 
For purposes of the decision before us# the law of 
contribution is governed by section 78-27-39 of the Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 1986). That 
section provides that a right of contribution among 
tort-feasors is recognized only after one tort-feasor has 
paid to discharge a liability common to two or more 
tort-feasors -or more than his prorata share thereof.-
(Footnote 2 continued.) 
here because no harmful error analysis was applied in that 
case. Instead, the court of appeals apparently assumed 
prejudice consistent with rule 61. It then remanded to the 
trial court because it was -unable to determine from the 
record . . . what the court actually considered in granting 
the summary judgment . . . .- Id. at 18 n.3. 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states: 
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by 
the court or by any of the parties, is 
ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
4. In Verde, we discussed harmless error in depth and 
attempted to articulate one harmless error standard that 
harmonizes the various rules which state the concept in 
different terms. One of the rules we considered in Verde is 
rule 61. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989). 
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Id.5 Fire Insurance contends that an adequate time to 
respond would have permitted it to persuade the trial court 
that Fire Insurance was entitled to contribution from the 
bank for damages caused by a breach of contract or an 
intentional tort they jointly committed. 
Even if we assume without deciding that Fire 
Insurance is correct/ the trial court's error would be harmful 
only if Fire Insurance can show that the jury awau&ed damages 
against it for which there is a reasonable probability that 
Fire Insurance could have persuaded the jury that it was 
entitled to contribution from the bank. Here/ the jury was 
instructed that it could award plaintiffs only such damages 
as Fire Insurance proximately caused.6 The jury was not 
told that it could award plaintiffs any damages to be paid by 
Fire Insurance for which the bank was responsible. And there 
is nothing in the record to persuade us that the jury violated 
its instruction and awarded any damages against Fire Insurance 
that were caused by the bank. There is not a reasonable 
likelihood that a jury would have found the bank to owe Fire 
Insurance contribution. Therefore, whether a right of 
contribution actually existed between the bank and Fire 
Insurance is of no consequence, and any error committed by 
the trial court in proceeding to consider the inadequately 
noticed motion for summary judgment is harmless* 
We next address Fire Insurances contention that the 
Crookstons1 claim was barred by the clause in the insurance 
contract stating, "No suit or action on this policy for the 
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of 
law or equity . . . unless commenced within 12 months next 
after inception of the loss." This lawsuit was filed in 
February of 1983, fourteen months after the house collapsed 
in December of 1981. We have previously said that 
5. Section 78-27-39 provides: 
(1) The right of contribution shall exist 
among joint tort-feasors, but a joint 
tort-feasor shall not be entitled to a 
money judgment for contribution until he 
[or she] has, by payment, discharged the 
common liability or more than his [or her] 
prorata share thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 1986). 
6. Instruction No. 37 states in full: 
You are not to award damages for any 
injury or condition from which the 
plaintiffs may have suffered, or may now be 
suffering, unless it has been established 
by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
case that such injury or condition was 
proximately caused by the conduct of 
defendant FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
contractual limitations on the time in which to bring actions 
on insurance contracts M,if reasonable, are valid, binding 
and enforceable,•w although looked upon with some disfavor, 
Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co,, 595 P.2d 863, 865 
(Utah 1979) (quoting Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
£Q_*_, 583 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1978)); see also Hibdon v. Truck 
Ins, Exch.. 657 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. 
Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co,, 21 Utah 2d 173, 175, 442 P.2d 
933, 934 (1968). However, we have not addressed the question 
of whether such standard form clauses operate to IJUait the 
time in which one may bring an action grounded in tort as 
opposed to breach of contract. 
There is a split of authority on the question of 
whether a limitation provision such as that contained in the 
contract of insurance at issue here applies to bar an insured 
from suing for an insurer's tortious conduct. Those courts 
holding the provision effective to bar such a suit reason 
that the tortious conduct of the insurer arises out of its 
obligations under the provisions of the policy and, there-
fore, it would be inequitable not to give effect to the 
limitation clause. See, G,g<, Barrow Dev, Co. v, Fulton Ins. 
CflU, 418 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1969); Zieba v. Middlesex 
Mut. Assurance Co., 549 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (D. Conn. 1982); 
Modern Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 125 Ga. 
App. 150, 152, 186 S.E.2d 586, 587 (1971). 
Those courts holding standard form limitations of 
the kind found in the Fire Insurance policy not applicable to 
tortious conduct reason that tort causes of action are not 
actions on the insurance contract but separate actions 
arising from the breach of a positive legal duty imposed by 
law. £££, etgt, Davis Vt State Farm Fire ft Casualty Cow 545 
F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. Nev. 1982); Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 
308 F. Supp. 847, 852-53 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Murohv v. Allstate 
Ins, CPt, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 571 (1978); Wabash Vallev 
Protective Union vt James, 35 N.E. 919, 920 (ind. 1893); 
Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 279, 452 
N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983); Plant Vt Illinois Employers Ins,, 
20 Ohio App. 3d 236, 237-38, 485 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1984); 
Lewis v. Farmers Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla. 1983); 
Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co.. 136 Wis. 2d 31, 35, 
400 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1987). 
In the context of a contract of insurance, we prefer 
this latter line of cases. By reading the "no suit or action 
on this policy" language as not covering tort, we are simply 
following the usual rule by which we narrowly construe a 
standard form contractual limitation provision that is not 
bargained for and is drafted by the insurance company for its 
own benefit, especially where that provision takes from the 
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other party rights conferred by existing statutes.7 See, 
e.g., LPS HOSP. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 
(Utah 1988); Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 94 
Utah 570, 575, 80 P.2d 348, 351 (1938); Vallev Bank & Trust 
v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Drauohon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc, 771 P.2d 1105, 
1108-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (limitation must use clear 
language). 
Because we conclude that the Crookstons1 tort causes 
of action are not barred by the insurance contract's limita-
tions provision, and because we have sustained the trial 
courtfs decision to uphold the juryfs finding of the tort of 
fraud and all damages awarded by the jury can be sustained 
upon the finding of fraud, we need not address the question 
of which of the other causes of action asserted by the 
Crookstons may be barred by the contractual limitation.8 
We next consider Fire Insurance's challenge to the 
jury's finding that Fire Insurance committed fraud* Fire 
Insurance contends that the jury instruction describing the 
fraud cause of action was erroneous. It also argues that 
even if the jury were properly instructed, there was 
insufficient evidence to support the finding of fraud. 
We first address Fire Insurance's claim that 
instruction 28 omitted or misstated three of the nine 
elements of fraud required in Utah. See generally Pace v. 
Parrish, 122 Utah 141# 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). 
Fire Insurance concedes that no objection was raised at trial 
to instruction 28, as is required by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 51. That rule states in pertinent part, "No party 
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he [or she] objects thereto." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 51. Fire Insurance would have us consider the 
propriety of the instruction anyway, relying on another part 
of rule 51, which states that "notwithstanding the foregoing 
7. See section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code, which confers a 
six-year limitation on actions pertaining to written 
instruments. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1987). 
8. We note that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
is an implied contractual provision, and a cause of action for 
its breach sounds in contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 
701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). However, we have never 
addressed the question of whether the time for bringing an 
action for such a breach runs from the date of the harm caused 
by the breach of the covenant or from the date of the event 
triggering the insured's alleged liability on the policy. If 
it runs from the former date, then the contractual limitation 
would not have barred the Crookstons' suit on that claim 
because the suit was filed less than twelve months after the 
challenged settlement with the bank. 
q 
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in 
the interests of justice, may review the giving of or failure 
to give an instruction." Id. 
We hold that discretionary review is not appropriate 
in this case. The last clause of rule 51 does permit us to 
review instructional errors in the interests of justice. 
"However, 'it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to 
present a persuasive reason' for exercising that discretion 
. . . and this requires 'showing special circumstances 
warranting such a review.'" Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 
17 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). In State v. Eldredcre, 
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989), we described the content of 
the analogous "manifest injustice" exception to Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 19(c)'s requirement that any instructional 
errors raised on appeal be first called to the trial court's 
attention by proper objection. We held that the term 
"manifest injustice" embodied the concepts of "plain error." 
See Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35-36. The last clause of rule 51 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the same 
concept. See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 
1989). In the present case, Fire Insurance has not begun to 
make the showing required by rule 51. Here, there was simple 
failure of trial counsel to preserve a narrow technical 
objection to an instruction. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 
at 17. Therefore/ we decline to consider its challenge to 
the fraud instruction. 
We next address Fire Insurance's contention that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of fraud and 
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial 
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v."). Before 
we consider this contention, we note the standard of review. 
In deciding whether to grant a new trial, a trial court has 
some discretion, and we reverse only for abuse of that 
discretion. In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v., however, 
a trial court has no latitude and must be correct. X&.9 
Appellate review of a trial court's denial of either motion 
9. In citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988), we 
note one point in which the lead opinion may be misleading. 
It states that "a new trial may be granted whenever there is 
evidence that would have permitted entry of a judgment for the 
losing party." Id. at 17. This statement is an accurate 
statement of the standard to be applied by an appellate court 
reviewing a trial court's grant of a new trial under rule 
59(a)(6). Read as a statement of the standard to be applied 
by a trial court addressing a new trial motion, it is 
inaccurate. A trial court cannot grant a new trial if there 
is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party 
and the judge merely disagrees with the judgment of the jury. 
Mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis on which to set 
(Continued on page 11.) 
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based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, however, 
is governed by one standard because of the differing degrees 
of discretion we accord trial courts in ruling initially on 
these motions. !&. Under that standard, we reverse only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict. Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17; King v. Feredav, 739 P.2d 
618, 620-21 (Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986). 
To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the findings. E.g., Morgan v. 
Ouailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 577 n.3 (Utah 
1985); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Here, Fire Insurance has made no attempt to marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury finding of fraud* In fact/ 
all Fire Insurance has done is argue selected evidence 
favorable to its position. That does not begin to meet the 
marshalling burden it must carry. We do not sit to retry the 
facts. £££ Cambelt inf 1 CoEPt vt Palton, 745 P.2d 1239, 
1242 (Utah 1987); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 
(Utah 1985). This failure alone is grounds to reject Fire 
Insurance^ attack on the fraud finding. E.g., Hansen, 761 
P.2d at 17; Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987); 
Hagan v. Hagan, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, 69 (Utah Ct* App. 
1991). 
Even if we were to review the record evidence for 
support, we would reject Fire Insurance's attack. The 
Crookstons alleged seven theories under which fraud could be 
found, and a casual review of the record indicates that there 
is ample evidence on at least one of the Crookstons' fraud 
theories to sustain the verdict. 
We have previously restated the elements of fraud as 
follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(Footnote 9 continued.) 
aside a verdict and order a new trial. King v. Fereday, 739 
p.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987); Price-Qrem Invt Cot Yt Rollins, 
Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986); £££. 
9lso c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 2803 (1973). Rather, a trial judge may properly grant a 
new trial under rule 59(a)(6) when he or she can reasonably 
conclude that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the 
evidence or that there is insufficient evidence to justify the 
verdict as more fully explained in Goddard v. Hickman, 585 
P.2d 530 (Utah 1984); see also Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 
350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). 
(2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his [or her] injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 
(1952); see also Mikkelson Vt Quail valley Realty, 641 p.2d 
124, 126 (Utah 1982); Kofrlec v, garden City, 639 P.2d 162, 
166 (Utah 1981); wgjqht v, westside Nursery, 787 p.2d 508, 
512 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud 
and Deceit §§ 432-436 (1968). We also stated in Pace that 
the elements of fraud must be proven by "clear and convincing 
evidence." Pace, 122 Utah at 143, 247 P.2d at 274. 
One of the seven theories upon which the Crookstons 
relied was that on June 16, 1982, Clapperton misrepresented 
to Klemm that Fire Insurance was not yet in a position to 
settle the claims and that he would include the Crookstons in 
any settlement negotiation. Clapperton made these representa-
tions knowing that he was prepared to settle with the bank 
that very day. There is ample evidence to support these 
factual claims. 
As for Fire Insurance's challenge to the jury's 
findings that reliance was reasonable and that the alleged 
misrepresentation did not damage the Crookstons, the record 
substantiates that the jury could have found by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Crookstons relied on Clapperton's 
representation that the company was not ready to settle and 
were induced to inaction thereby, with the result that Fire 
Insurance was able to settle the matter with the bank without 
their participation for an unfairly low amount. The inade-
quacy of the amount paid the bank by Fire Insurance set in 
motion the events that ultimately resulted in the Crookstons* 
bankruptcy and the ensuing harm. Therefore, we find no error 
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in the denial of both the j-n.o.v. and the new trial motion 
on this ground. 
Fire Insurance's next claim is that the award of 
compensatory and punitive damages violates the ban on 
excessive fines and the due process provision of the Utah 
Constitution* See Utah Const, art. I, § 9; Utah Const, 
art. I, § 7.10 Fire Insurance did not, however, raise 
these arguments before the trial court and has therefore 
waived any right to present them on appeal.11 Seg=P e.g., 
Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145, 148-49 (Utah 1978); Bullock v. 
Joe Bailey Auction Co., 580 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1978); Edgar 
v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1977); State Road Comm'n 
v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 300, 495 P.2d 817, 821 (1972). 
Fire Insurance also attacks the jury's verdict under 
rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That 
rule provides that a trial court can grant a new trial if the 
damages awarded are "excessive [in amount] . . . appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5). Fire Insurance contends that both 
the compensatory and the punitive damage awards meet this 
10. Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall 
not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9. 
Article I, section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
11. Regarding the claimed due process violations, we note 
that the United States Supreme Court recently held that the 
procedures followed under Alabama law in awarding and 
reviewing punitive damage awards were adequate and did not 
violate the federal due process provision. See Pacific Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip. No. 89-1279, U.S. (1991); ss& 
also Browning-Ferris Indust v» Kelco Disposal, Inct, 106 L. 
Ed. 2d 219, 242 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bankers Life 
& Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (OfConnor, 
J., concurring). In Hammond v. Citv of Gadsden. 493 So. 2d 
1374 (Ala. 1986), Alabama implemented a procedure requiring a 
post-trial hearing in cases involving punitive damages wherein 
the judge must state on the record the reasons for revising or 
upholding the jury's award. See generally D. Blan & J. Hart, 
The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, December 1990 For 
the Defense 12, 20. The procedure has now largely been 
enacted by statute- Sea Ala. Code § 6-11-23 (Supp. 1990). 
The standards followed by courts of this state in the past for 
awarding punitive damages, and certainly the standards we 
today adopt for review of punitive damage awards, are at least 
as stringent as, if not more stringent than, those followed in 
Alabama. 
l -* 
test and that the trial court erred in denying its motion for 
a new trial or a remittitur. In support of its contention, 
Fire Insurance relies on a number of our prior decisions in 
which we reduced or reversed awards of compensatory or 
punitive damages on grounds they were "excessive." See, 
eTq-/ First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., 
653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982) (upholding total compensatory 
damages of $36,000 but cutting punitives from $100,000 to 
$50,000 and compensatories for emotional distress from 
$25,000 to $12,500).12 — -
Fire Insurance correctly points out that in the 
present case, the amount of both compensatory and punitive 
damages awarded is far greater than the awards reduced in 
many prior cases and that the ratio of punitives to compen-
satories is higher than has been sustained in any of our 
prior cases where large dollar awards were made. Essentially, 
Fire Insurance contends that the results in those cases, when 
considered together, amount to a determination of what consti-
tutes "excessive" damages as a matter of law, damages that we 
have concluded must have been the result of passion or 
prejudice. Fire Insurance asks that even if we sustain the 
finding of liability for fraud, we make a reduction in the 
amount of both compensatory and punitive damages. Alterna-
tively, it asks that we remand for a new trial on the issue 
of damages. 
12. Other cases in which we have reduced or vacated and 
remanded damage awards include Jensen v. Pioneer Dodae Center, 
Inc.f 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985) (upholding compensatories of 
$1,400 but remanding for reduction of punitives of $100,000 as 
grossly disproportionate); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) (remanding for reduction a $25,000 
punitive award as grossly disproportionate to compensatory 
damages of $2,133 where court found a low degree of malice and 
there were no findings as to defendant's wealth); Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (compensatory damages of 
$59,600 upheld but punitive award of $25,000 reversed for 
failure to establish defendant's net worth); Cruz v. Montoya, 
660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) (reducing punitives from $12,000 to 
$6,000 based on lack of findings as to defendant's wealth 
where compensatories were $9,000, $7,500 of which were 
"soft"); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) (reducing 
punitives from $10,000 to $5,000); Prince yf Peterson, 538 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives already below 
compensatory damages with no explanation); Nance v. Sheet 
Metal workers int'l Assoc, 364 p.2d 1027 (Utah 1961) 
(reversing $40,000 punitives entered by trial court where jury 
had awarded none and where there were only nominal compensa-
tory damages); Wilson v. Oldrovd, 267 P.2d 759 (Utah 1954) 
(punitives of $25,000 reduced to $5,000 where compensatories 
were $50,000) . 
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In deciding whether Fire Insurance's claim has any 
merit, we have reviewed many of our prior decisions passing 
on claims that damage awards were "excessive." We have also 
reviewed many of our prior cases considering claims that a 
trial court had abused its discretion in granting or denying 
a. motion for a new trial. Collectively, this review has left 
us dissatisfied with the state of the case law. There is 
little consistency either in our statements of the appro-
priate standard of review to be applied or in the standard we 
have actually applied. Sometimes, we have approacITed such 
cases as though we were reviewing a trial court's review of 
the verdict," while at other times, we appear to have 
directly reviewed the verdict, ignoring any intermediate 
actions by the trial court.14 
Because the standard-of-review law is confused in 
this area, we must attempt to clarify it before considering 
the merits of Fire Insurance's claim. Today, we attempt to 
bring some order to the processes used in determining and 
reviewing damage awards* We will address the relative roles 
of the jury, the trial court, and the appellate court. We 
will also address the substantive standards for determining 
the lawfulness of a particular award. Our discussion of the 
subject will be divided into three parts. First, we will 
address the standard of review to be applied by a trial court 
considering a motion that attacks the amount of a jury's 
damage award. Second, we will discuss the standard of review 
to be followed by an appellate court reviewing a trial court's 
decisions on a challenge to a jury's damage award. Third, we 
will explain the substantive standards by which the damage 
13. Cases in which we seem to defer to the trial court 
include Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980) (defer-
ring to trial court stating that its action on the award lends 
solidarity); Holdawav v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 80, 505 P.2d 
295, 296 (1973) (w[W]e cannot say that the trial judge abused 
his discretion in not further reducing the amount of punitive 
damages."); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 140, 369 P.2d 290, 
295 (1962) (action of trial court lends verity to verdict, 
although court speaks of reviewing jury directly); Wellman v. 
-Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 353-54, 366 P.2d 701, 703-04 (1961) 
(trial court upheld if reasonable); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 
381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1941) (trial court accorded 
great latitude). 
14. £££, e.g., Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314, 327-28 (Utah 
1979) (reversing remittitur and reinstating original award), 
rgv'fl on refr'q, 617 P.2d 700 (1980); Prince v. Petersen, 538 
P.2d at 1329 (reducing trial court award without explanation); 
Falkenbura v. Neff, 269 P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing 
punitives of $5,000 to $1,500 where compensatories were 
$362.50 while stating that court defers to trial court in 
assessing damages except where, as here, they are so 
disproportionate as to be excessive as a matter of law). 
award is to be judged. Finally, we will apply these 
standards to the decision of the trial court here. 
The first part of our clarification effort requires 
an explanation of the standard of review to be applied by a 
trial court in ruling on a motion for a new trial attacking 
the amount of the jury's award. Initially, we note the 
procedural posture in which claims that a particular damage 
award is excessive generally come before the trial court 
because it is critical to understanding the relaii^Le roles of 
jury, trial court, and appellate court. After a jury returns 
a damage award in a civil case, the most common way for the 
losing party to challenge the amount of the award is to move 
for a new trial or remittitur under rule 59(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59(a) provides in part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes . . . : 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury . . . . 
(3) Accident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence . . . . 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a).15 
15. It should be noted that although many of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure differ only slightly, if at all, from the 
(Continued on page 17.) 
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The general rule governing the grant of a new trial 
is that the trial court must find at least one of the seven 
(Footnote 15 continued,) 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59 is different. The 
Utah rule lists seven exclusive grounds on which a new trial 
may be granted. In contrast, the federal rule simply states 
that a new trial may be granted -for any of the reasons for 
which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at 
law in the courts of the United States.- Fed. R. Civ. P. 
59(a)(1); cf^_ Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 
(4th Cir. 1941), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit provided an articulate history of rule 59, 
tracing it back to the 17th century. Quoting from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it stated: 
[Ability to grant new trials] is a power to 
examine the whole case on the law and the 
evidence, with a view to securing a result, 
not merely legal, but also not manifestly 
against justice/—a power exercised in 
pursuance of sound judicial discretion, 
without which the jury system would be a 
capricious and intolerable tyranny. . . . 
[I]t was a power the courts ought to 
exercise unflinchingly. 
IJL. at 353 (quoting Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 
481, 36 A. 296, 298 (1897)). The court continued: 
[The jurors] are not, and have never been, 
independent of the court of which they are 
a part, but their verdicts must meet the 
approval/ or at least they must not offend 
the sense of justice, of the presiding 
judge, who, as the late Justice Grier, of 
the supreme court of the United States/ was 
fond of saying, was by virtue of his [or 
her] position "the thirteenth juror." 
Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that Lord Mansfield 
had also recognized the necessity of "a power, somewhere/ to 
grant new trials.- Id. (quoting Bright v. Envon, 1 Burrows 
390 (1757)). 
Finally, the court went on to explain the uniqueness of 
the standard of review for new trial motions due to the facts 
that the trial court/ in reviewing the jury, must give them 
some deference and that the appellate court must defer to the 
trial judge in further reviewing the decision. Unlike 
directing a verdict, which a trial judge may do "only where 
there is no substantial evidence, [a v]erdict may be set aside 
and new trial granted, when the verdict is contrary to the 
clear weight of the evidence, or whenever in the exercise of a 
sound discretion the trial judge thinks this action necessary 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 354 (citations 
omitted). 
(Continued on page 18.) 
grounds listed in rule 59 to be met,16 See Hancock v. 
Planned Dev. Corp,, 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990); Tanaaro v. 
Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 292 n.2, 373 P.2d 390, 391 n.2 
(1962); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89-90 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) . In the context of a challenge to the amount of 
an award, two of those grounds are pertinent, subparts 
(5)—excessive damages—and (6)—insufficient evidence• If 
the court finds that a new trial is warranted on one of these 
grounds as to the amount of the award, it may encourage the 
parties to come to some mutually agreeable solution-rather 
than incur the time and expense of a new trial* The court 
often does this, in the context of a damage award, by 
proposing a remittitur or additur to the jury's award of 
damages. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216, 
217 (Utah 1976); Ruf v. Association for World Travel Exch., 
10 Utah 2d 249, 249, 351 P.2d 623, 623 (1960); Bourne v. 
Moore, 77 Utah 184, 186, 292 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1930); Gearv v. 
Cain, 69 Utah 340, 347, 255 P. 416, 420 (1927);. Eleaanti v. 
Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585, 592, 168 P. 266, 268 (1917). 
The parties may then accept the alteration and avoid a new 
trial or reject the proposal and begin anew.17 If the 
party against whom the motion is brought rejects the 
proposal, the court may then grant a new trial on the issue 
of damages. 
(Footnote 15 continued.) 
Although the Fourth Circuitfs review was related to the 
development of the federal rule, Utah's rule is based on the 
same rationale. Utah has simply chosen to delineate specific 
exclusive grounds, which the federal courts have not done. We 
accept the Fourth Circuit's summary in Aetna Casualty as 
largely accurate. 
16. Those portions of Utah's rule 59 with which we are 
concerned date back at least to 1888, when rule 59's prede-
cessor was part of Utah's Code of Civil Procedure. See 1888 
Utah Laws ch. 8, § 3400. These provisions have remained 
largely unchanged since that time. The statute was apparently 
modeled after a similar California provision enacted in 1851. 
See 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. 5, § 193, at 81 (current version 
enacted in 1872). Utah's original version of the law, adopted 
in 1870, was modeled after this California provision. See 
1870 Utah Laws ch. 7, art. 2, § 193. Although the Utah 
provision changed repeatedly until 1888, the 1888 version is 
substantially similar to that now found in rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. For that reason, our review of 
relevant case law includes reference to many Utah decisions 
that antedate the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1951. 
17. Federal courts also allow for such a procedure. "A 
remittitur gives the plaintiff a choice. He [or she] can 
refuse to accept the reduced amount of damages and instead 
proceed to a new trial." 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2815 (1973). 
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Under our rule 59, it is well settled that, as a 
general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant 
or deny a motion for a new trial, Hancock, 791 P.2d at 
184-85; Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 
1988); Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 186, 389 P.2d 736, 
736 (1964); Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins, Co,, 5 Utah 2d 257, 
261, 391 P.2d 290, 292-93 (1964); Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 
407, 98 P. 300, 305 (1908). The precise nature of that 
discretion and what constitutes an abuse, however, are not 
clearly stated in many of our individual cases, though 
perhaps it may be gleaned from a collective reading of them. 
In the context of a new trial motion attacking the amount of 
a jury verdict under subparts (5) and (6) of rule 59(a), it 
is the responsibility of the trial court to review the amount 
of the award to ensure that the jury has acted within its 
proper bounds. If the verdict does not satisfy the 
requirements of 59(a)(5) or (6), the judge must uphold the 
award. 
The reason that any determination as to whether the 
jury exceeded its proper bounds is best made in the first 
instance by the trial court is that the trial judge is 
present during all aspects of the trial and listens to and 
views all witnesses. Therefore, he or she can best determine 
if the jury has acted with "passion or prejudice" and whether 
the award was too small or too large in light of the evidence. 
The trial judge is free to grant or deny a motion for a new 
trial if it is reasonable to conclude that the jury erred. 
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). On 
the other hand, the trial court cannot grant a new trial 
merely because it disagrees with the jury's judgment. King 
v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. 
Co. v, Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 
(Utah 1986); S3SL Saltgs v, Affleck/ 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 
P.2d 176, 178 (1940).18 
If the trial court determines that a new trial is 
warranted and grants the motion, it should describe the basis 
for its decision in the record such that an appellate court 
can have the benefit of those reasons. In Saltas v. Affleck, 
Justice Moffat, speaking for this court, described why such a 
statement of reasons is necessary: 
In order to eliminate speculation as to the 
basis of the exercise of judicial 
discretion in granting new trials, the 
record should show the reasons and make it 
clear the court is not invading the 
18. But cf. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1989) 
(stating that trial judge may grant new trial whenever there 
is evidence to support different verdict). This statement in 
Hansen is clarified in footnote 9 of this opinion. 
1 O 
province of the jury. The trial court 
should indicate wherein there was a plain 
disregard by the jury of the instructions 
of the court or the evidence or what 
constituted bias p_r prejudice on the part 
of the jury. If no reasons need be given 
the province of the jury may be invaded at 
will. With no indication as to the basis 
for exercise of the power vested in the 
court to grant new trials the appeal 
tribunal would be left to analyze the 
matter from the evidence, the record, and 
the instructions. It would be required to 
search out possible reasons for agreeing or 
disagreeing with the trial court in the 
exercise of a discretion. The exercise of 
judicial discretion must be based upon some 
facts notwithstanding great latitude is 
accorded the trial court in such matter. 
Saltas, 99 Utah at 386-87, 105 P.2d at 178 (citation omitted)* 
Thus, in passing on a motion for a new trial, if the 
trial court cannot reasonably find that the jury erred, it 
should deny the motion. On the other hand, if the trial 
court can reasonably conclude that there was insufficient 
evidence to justify the verdict or it is manifestly against 
the weight of the evidence in violation of rule 59(a)(6) or 
that the jury acted with passion or prejudice contrary to 
rule 59(a)(5), it may grant the motion and order a new trial* 
We next address the standard of review by which an 
appellate court reviews a trial court decision to grant or 
deny a new trial motion challenging a verdict as excessive 
under rule 59. In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to 
grant or deny a new trial, we will reverse only if there is 
no reasonable basis for the decision.19 See Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d at 353, 366 P.2d at 703; see also State v. 
Petersen, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20-21 (Utah 1991). For 
example, even if the jury's award appears supported by 
substantial evidence on appeal, if the trial judge could 
reasonably conclude that the jury had acted in a manner 
covered by the grounds stated in rule 59(a)(5) or (6), an 
order granting a new trial will be upheld on appeal. 
Wellman, 12 Utah 2d at 354, 366 P.2d at 704. Similarly, a 
19. We note that if, as a preliminary matter prior to the 
ultimate determination of the motion, the judge relies on 
legal principles which are erroneous or facts which are wholly 
without record support, this may also constitute grounds for 
reversal. See State v. Petersen, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 
(Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 n.3 (Utah 
1991). 
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trial court's decision to deny a new trial will be upheld if 
there is a reasonable basis to support that decision.20 
In light of the foregoing, some statements about 
standards of review in prior cases can be read as misleading, 
though not actually incorrect. For example, in Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), 
we stated that a "reviewing court will defer to a jury's 
damage award unless the award indicates that the jury 
disregarded competent evidence.- Id. at 1084 (citations 
omitted); see also Battv v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 
(Utah 1978). See generally Bundv v. Century Equip. Co., 692 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). This statement of 
the standard, though perhaps not an inaccurate characteriza-
tion of the test to be applied by a trial court faced with a 
new trial motion under rule 59, is inaccurate if it purports 
to state the standard of review by which an appellate court 
determines the propriety of a trial courtfs decision to grant 
or deny a new trial* The statement can be read to mean that 
this court reviews the juryfs action directly, when in 
reality we review the trial court's action for an abuse of 
discretion.21 It is this type of loosely worded standard 
which has, over time, effectively confused the appellate 
court's proper role in assessing the merits of a rule 59 
motion attacking a jury verdict with that of the trial 
judge. E.g., Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083-84; Bundy, 692 P.2d 
at 758-59; First Security/ 653 P.2d at 599; Patty, 575 P.2d 
at 1043. 
Having, we hope, clarified the respective roles of 
the trial and appellate courts as they pertain to rule 59 
attacks on jury verdicts, we now move on to consider the 
merits of Fire Insurance's challenge to the amount of 
compensatory and punitive damages awarded by the jury. Fire 
Insurance contends that both compensatory and punitive 
damages are excessive. Because issues of law and policy 
differ as to each type of damages, we consider these claims 
separately. 
We first address the compensatory damage award. 
Fire Insurance relies on First Security Bank of Utah v. 
20. We note that the trial court's discretion with regard to 
denying a motion for a new trial or a remittitur on the issue 
of punitive damages is further limited by other conditions as 
explained later in this opinion. See infra notes 24-31 and 
accompanying text. 
21. We note that in Bennion, no new trial motion was 
presented to the trial court and, thus, this court was 
considering the issue de novo. See Bennion v. LeGrand Constr. 
Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083-84 (Utah 1985). We use this 
statement of the standard in Bennion as an example simply 
because of the possibility that it may be misread. 
J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., as support for its claim that the 
compensatory damages are excessive. The Crookstons' economic 
loss amounted to approximately $323,399. Fire Insurance 
argues that the remaining $492,427 awarded to the two 
Crookstons, who are no longer married, for emotional and 
mental distress and loss of financial reputation is 
excessive. Fire Insurance argues that the soft compensatory 
damages in this case are analogous to the damages for 
emotional distress in First Security, which were cut from 
$25,000 to $12,500 on appeal. In First Securitvrr!this court 
stated that damages for emotional distress should be awarded 
with caution. Id. at 598; see also Gumbs v. Pueblo Infl. 
Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 1987). 
In the present case, Judge Frederick considered the 
excessiveness of the compensatory damages when Fire Insurance 
moved for a new trial or a remittitur. He concluded not only 
that the amount awarded was justified by both the law and the 
evidence, but that even a higher amount would have been 
appropriate. He made the following observations: 
During the course of the ten or so days 
that we tried the case/ it was my 
observation that indeed we were dealing 
here with conduct which was pernicious, 
pernicious not merely in the sense of the 
defendant[fs] having taken und[ue] 
advantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, 
in treating their claim in a high-handed 
fashion, but pernicious further in the 
sense that clear, unequivocal 
misrepresentations were made by agents of 
the defendant to the plaintiffs and to 
their counsel, and as if that were not 
sufficient, pernicious in the form of 
conduct, which, while it may not have been 
geared to create emotional harm and 
suffering to the plaintiffs, was, at the 
very least, in reckless disregard of their 
rights by dealing sub rosa with the bank 
and thereafter closing the file and 
advising the plaintiffs to file, the claim 
file would be closed. 
In making an ultimate determination of the propriety 
of the award, Judge Frederick stated: 
I have reviewed my notes and I recall the 
evidence in the regard that I am referring 
to and I am not in the least persuaded that 
the jury in this case overstepped their 
bounds in awarding excessive general 
damages and punitive damages. On the 
nonm/i 22 
contrary, this case, in my judgment, could 
well have resulted in greater damages than 
were awarded by the jury. 
While it is true, as we stated in First Security, 
that soft compensatory damages, i-e., for pain and suffering, 
must be awarded with caution, °[w]hen the determination of 
the jury has been submitted to the scrutiny and judgment of 
the trial judge, his [or her] action thereon should be 
regarded as giving further solidarity to the judtjffifertt • * 
Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980)- Or, as we 
said in Gearv v. Cain, 69 Utah at 358, 255 P. at 423, M[I]n 
case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial court 
should prevail- Otherwise this court will sooner or later 
find itself usurping the functions of both the jury and the 
trial court." JiU These statements in Elkinaton and Geary 
are consistent with our statement of the appropriate 
appellate standard of review today-
The judge's determination to deny a new trial on 
this issue was reasonable in light of the law and the facts. 
See Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989); In 
re Estate Of Bgrtell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)- In 
addition, Judge Frederick articulated support for the award 
in the record- Although his statements could have been more 
specific, they were sufficient to justify his upholding the 
compensatory damage award- See Saltas, 99 Utah at 386-87, 
105 P-2d at 178. We therefore uphold the trial court's 
decision to deny a new trial on the question of compensatory 
damages-22 
22. Although Fire Insurance also contends on appeal that the 
court failed to allocate attorney fees between the bank and 
Fire Insurance, that argument was not raised below and is 
therefore waived- See State v. Anderson, 789 P-2d 27, 29 
(Utah 1990). 
Fire Insurance also argues that the award here so shocks 
"one's conscience [as] to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, 
or corruption on the part of the jury." Duffy v. Union 
Pacific R.R., 118 Utah 82, 89, 218 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1950) 
(citations omitted). Therefore, Fire Insurance contends that 
regardless of the trial court*s action, this court can and 
should reverse or reduce the award as we did in First 
Security, 653 P.2d at 598-99; see also Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 
Utah 2d at 372, 267 P.2d at 764; Duffy, 118 Utah at 91-92, 218 
P.2d at 1085- We stated in Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 
692 P.2d at 760, "It is well settled that when an award of 
punitive damages is determined to be excessive or otherwise 
inappropriate, this court may order a new trial on the issue 
of damages or, in the alternative, remission of a portion of 
the punitive damages by the plaintiff. •• ££. While it is true 
that this court has the power to grant a new trial in an 
(Continued on page 24,) 
23 
We next consider the claim that the punitive damage 
award was excessive, warranting a new trial. The jury 
awarded $4,000,000 in punitive damages, which Fire Insurance 
claims is excessive under rule 59(a)(5) for the same reasons 
it argued that the compensatory damage award is excessive. 
Any motion for a new trial on the question of punitive 
damages requires that the trial court engage in a two-part 
inquiry:23 (i) whether punitives are appropriate at all, 
i.e., whether the evidence is sufficient to support a lawful 
jury finding of defendant's requisite mental state—see Utah 
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6); Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 P.2d at 41; 
(Footnote 22 continued.) 
appropriate case, we will do so only according to the standard 
we adopt today, i.e., we will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial judge in making a decision on a motion for a 
new trial. Such a decision will be upheld if there is a 
reasonable basis for it based on the law and the facts. This 
court's statement in Duffy applies equally here: 
The verdict here was admittedly liberal. 
But the mere fact that it was more than 
another jury, or more than this court, 
might have given, or even more than the 
evidence justified, does not conclusively 
show that it was the result of passion, 
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury. 
Duffy, 118 Utah at 89, 218 P.2d at 1083 (citations omitted). 
23* The legal elements that must be met to sustain an award 
of punitive damages are now largely controlled by statute, 
although the statute does not apply to this case because it is 
made applicable only to claims for punitive damages arising on 
or after May 1, 1989. 1989 Utah Laws ch. 237, § 4. Section 
78-18-1 provides that before any punitive damages can be 
awarded, the finder of fact must be shown "by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of wilful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, 
the rights of others." Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1)(a) (Supp. 
1990). Therefore, a judge faced with a new trial motion must 
ensure that the evidence is sufficient on this point before 
upholding any award. These standards do not apply to 
punitives arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle 
while voluntarily intoxicated. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-18-1(1)(b). 
Under the statute, evidence of a defendant's wealth would 
be admissible only after the jury had properly determined that 
an award of punitive damages was proper. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-18-1(2). Additionally, 50 percent of any punitives 
awarded in excess of $20,000 is remitted to the state 
treasurer after payment of attorney fees and costs. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-18-1(3). 
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Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359-60 (Utah 1975); Prince v. 
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975), and (ii) whether 
the amount of punitives is excessive or inadequate, appearing 
to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5). 
With regard to the first inquiry required of the 
trial judge, under our case law, punitives are allowed only 
where there is w'wilful and maliciousf conduct, . . . or 
. . . conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of 
others." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 
1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted); see also Rugg v. 
Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 304, 117 P. 54, 57 (1911). Here, 
although Fire Insurance's motion for a new trial on damages 
did not expressly raise 59(a)(6) grounds, the trial court, in 
passing on the new trial motion, did conclude that there was 
substantial record evidence to support the juryfs determina-
tion that Fire Insurance acted with reckless disregard of 
Crookston's rights. We also note that the jury properly 
found intentional fraud. Therefore, we hold that the trial 
court correctly concluded that Fire Insurance had acted with 
the mental state required for punitives. 
As to the second inquiry required—whether the 
amount of the award was appropriate—Judge Frederick 
articulated the same basis for denying a new trial on the 
amount of punitives as he did for denying the motion on the 
amount of compensatories. However, punitives are, by nature, 
not to compensate but to punish and deter future egregious 
conduct and are grounded on wholly different policies. 
Moreover, the amount of punitives awarded here exceeds the 
bounds of the general pattern set by our prior decisions. 
Therefore, we vacate the trial court's ruling on the new 
trial motion and remand for reconsideration. 
We will now give a detailed explanation for this 
portion of our holding. 
As we noted earlier in this opinion, a review of our 
case law on punitive damages has left us dissatisfied with 
articulated standards for determining the amount of such 
awards. These standards provide little guidance for either a 
jury fixing the punitive damages, a trial court reviewing a 
challenge to the amount of such an award, or an appellate 
court reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a new 
trial on grounds of an inadequate or excessive award. We 
have, however, found that the results of our prior cases 
dealing with challenges to damages, taken as a whole, provide 
patterns that furnish useful guidance as to what constitutes 
an excessive award. Based on these patterns, we now craft a 
set of guidelines that retain the advantages of flexibility 
but clearly set parameters beyond which awards may not go 
without some expressed justification. This framework should 
bring some predictability to this area of the law and should 
permit courts to more explicitly address the considerations 
that come into play in fixing the amount of punitive damage 
awards. 
The stated list of factors we have said must be 
considered in assessing the amount of punitives to be awarded 
include the following seven: (i) the relative wealth of the 
defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged miscoir*ret; 
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; 
(iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and 
others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the 
misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and 
(vii) the amount of actual damages awarded. See Bundv v. 
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). Our cases have 
done little more than list these factors. No relative 
weights have been assigned them, and no standards or formulas 
have been established for properly evaluating them when 
making an award or when reviewing the propensity of a jury 
award. This makes such an enterprise highly problematic for 
judge and jury. The finder of fact has no guidance on how 
much weight to give each factor or even how the factors 
should be assessed. And nothing suggests to the jury or the 
trial court that there is any sort of limit or ceiling on an 
award. 
There is nothing uniquely vague about the punitive 
damage standards set out in our cases. Many other 
jurisdictions have quite similar lists of factors that are 
supposed to guide the award of punitives. See American 
College of Trial Lawyers, Report on Punitive Damages of the 
Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of 
Justice 3-7 (Mar. 3, 1989) [hereinafter "Report on Punitive 
Damages"! (such vague standards are problematic nationwide). 
And, quite predictably, the bases for awards made in those 
jurisdictions are no more fathomable than ours. The problem 
that results from this lack of guidance to juries and trial 
courts is exemplified by disparate ratios of punitive to 
actual damages that appear in separate cases involving 
similar conduct. 
It might be argued that widely disparate punitive 
damage awards by separate juries for the same conduct 
reflects only the weakness of the jury system, not the 
weakness of the list-of-factors standard for measuring 
punitives. But that explanation fails where it is confronted 
with the fact that appellate courts in different jurisdictions 
applying essentially the same standard have reached wildly 
different conclusions as to what ratio of actuals to 
punitives is legitimate under the pure list-of-factors 
approach. Compare Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Tompkins, 
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490 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1986) (upholding punitives of $400,000 
and actuals of $500, a ratio of 800 to 1) with Prince v. 
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives from 
$3,000 to $1,000 where actuals were $5,537, with no 
explanation). The Alabama Supreme Court has noted the 
weakness in the list of factors used in Alabama, which is 
quite similar to Utah's list: 
[F]or the same conduct, one insurance 
company and its special agent were punished 
by a punitive damages award of $21,130.86 
. . . and another insurance company and its 
special agent were punished by a punitive 
damages award of $2,490,000 . . . . The 
instruction given to the juries in those 
two cases were substantially the same. 
. . . [T]he standard by which the jury is 
to gauge.the amount of punitive damages, if 
any, that it is to award is incomprehensibly 
vague and unintelligible • • • • Under 
such a "standard," one jury can award 
$21,130.86 and another $2,490,000 for the 
same "wrong." 
Charter HOSP. of Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So- 2d 909, 
916-17 (Ala. 1990). 
Many states have recognized the problems created by 
giving finders of fact essentially standardless discretion to 
award punitive damages and have legislatively determined that 
trial courts may not sanction punitive damage awards that 
exceed actual damages by a certain ratio. See, e.g.f Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitives cannot exceed 
actual damages); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73(1)(a) (1989) 
(punitives cannot exceed three times actual damages); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (punitives can only 
exceed actual damages if clear and convincing evidence of 
fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton or reckless disregard 
for other's rights); see also Report on Punitive Damages 5 
n.21. 
At least one court has fixed a rough ratio ceiling 
by judicial decision. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, in considering an award of punitive 
damages in an intentional business tort case under Texas law, 
stated, "A formula of punitive damages equal to three times 
compensatory damages is a fairly good standard against which 
to assess whether a jury abused its discretion.* Miley v. 
Qppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Other states have imposed strict dollar ceilings 
on punitive damage awards. See, e,gf. Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1990) ($250,000 ceiling except in cases 
of product liability or intentional tort); Va. Code Ann, 
§ 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1990) ($350,000 ceiling). 
The courts of both Connecticut and Michigan have 
judicially imposed bright-line limits on punitive damage 
awards. See, e.g., Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (1966) 
(limiting punitives to compensate for expenses of litiga-
tion); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 
401, 419-21, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (only allowing-what it 
termed "punitives" to compensate for "soft" or intangible 
harm). 
The advantages of imposing bright-line ceilings on 
punitive awards are obvious. A ceiling provides unmistakable 
guidance to juries, trial courts, and appellate courts. 
However, the absolute ceiling approach is too mechanical and 
could potentially defeat the very purpose of punitive damages. 
See generally Phillips, A Comment on Proposals for 
Determining Amounts of Punitive Awards, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1117 
(1989); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a 
Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639 (1980) [hereinafter 
Mallor & Roberts]. For example, strict dollar amount, 
percentage of the defendant's wealth, and ratio ceilings all 
would allow potential defendants to calculate their exposure 
to liability in advance, thus diminishing the deterrent 
effect of punitive damages. In addition, such absolute 
ceilings do not provide the flexibility needed to deal 
adequately with the type of case that involves only minimal 
actual damages, but where the conduct of the defendant is so 
flagrant as to justify a large punitive award. See generally 
Mallor & Roberts at 666-67. 
Bearing in mind the weaknesses of reliance on a 
list-of-factors standard alone and the weaknesses created by 
absolute ceilings, whether legislatively or judicially 
created, we conclude that when considered together, the 
language and pattern of results from our prior cases provide 
a basis for finding a middle ground.24 
24. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Jensen 
v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985); 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 
1985); Bundv v. Century Eouip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1984); Cruz v. 
Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983); Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, IttCt, 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982); First Security 
Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1982); Clavton v. Crossroads Eouip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1982); Elkinoton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Terrv v. 
Z.C.M.I.. 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
(Continued on page 29.) 
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Among the seven factors we have repeatedly listed 
that should be considered in determining the amount of a 
punitive damage award is the "amount of actual damages." 
E.g., Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759- Although we have not 
articulated any standard for determining the importance to be 
assigned this factor, we have said that the amount of a 
punitive damage award generally must bear a "reasonable and 
rational" relationship to the actual damages.25 I£. The 
punitive damage awards we have characterized as violating 
this "reasonable and rational- relationship rule have been 
labeled "grossly disproportionate" to the actual damages 
awarded and have been said to be the result of passion or 
prejudice. These awards have been either reduced by this 
court directly or remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. See, e.g., Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, 
Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 101 (Utah 1985). 
Although vague in its articulation, an examination 
of the results of our cases shows that in its operation, this 
-reasonable and rational- relationship principle has produced 
some fairly predictable results. Generally, we have found 
punitive damage awards below $100,000 not to be excessive 
only when the punitives do not exceed actual damages by more 
than a ratio of approximately 3 to l.26 See, e.g., Von 
(Footnote 24 continued.) 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984); 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542~P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); Prince v. 
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975); Holdawav v. Hall, 29 Utah 
2d 77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973); Powers v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 
379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 
290 (1962); Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc, 12 Utah 
2d 233, 364 P.2d 1027 (1961); Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 
390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960); Ostertao v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 
339 P.2d 1022 (1959); Sadleir v. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 
P.2d 278 (1956); Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 
759 (1954); Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 
(1952). 
25. Although this is only one of the factors identified by 
this court to date to be considered in determining an 
appropriate amount of damages, it is one which is more 
concretely definable and which we today further refine to give 
better guidance. We leave for another day the possibility of 
further refining other factors we have previously identified, 
as well as the possibility that additional factors may be 
developed as we consider particular situations presented to us 
in the course of reviewing trial court rulings. 
26. A few cases have upheld punitives above a 3 to 1 ratio. 
S££ Ostertao v. LaMont, 339 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1959) (upholding 
punitives of $860 to actual damages of $140); see also 
Falkenburo v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 270, 269 P.2d 1008, 1013 
(1928) (reducing punitives to $1,500 where actuals were 
$362.50) . 
?Q 
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Elkincrton v. 
Foust. 618 P-2d 37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 
152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 
P.2d 290 (1962); Evans v. Gaisford. 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 
431 (1952). 
Because of the limited number of cases considering 
large awards, it is more difficult to note a particular 
pattern once the award exceeds approximately $10-§=F§00. 
However, it is safe to say that these large awards appear to 
receive more scrutiny than the smaller awards and that the 
acceptable ratio appears lower* See, e.g., Von Hake, 705 
P.2d at 772 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(majority opinion upholding $500,000 punitives—1 to 1 
ratio); gynerqetics vt Mgygthon Rflnqhjng QQf, 701 P.2d 1106, 
1113 (Utah 1985) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(majority upholding $200,000 punitives—1/2 to 1 ratio). In 
one such case, when the ratio exceeded 2 to 1, we reduced the 
award on grounds of excessiveness. See First Security Bank, 
653 P.2d at 598-99 (reducing $100,000 punitives—3 to 1 
ratio—to $50,000—2 to 1 ratio). 
The general rule to be drawn from our past cases 
appears to be that where the punitives are well below 
$100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to 
actual damages have seldom been upheld and that where the 
award is in excess of $100,000, we have indicated some 
inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than 
3 to 1. 
In these patterns, we find that guidelines emerge 
for trial courts faced with challenges to punitive damage 
awards on the grounds of excessiveness under rule 59(a)(5). 
If the ratio of punitive to actual damages falls within the 
range that this court has consistently upheld, then the trial 
court may assume that the award is not excessive. In denying 
a rule 59(a)(5) motion for a new trial, the trial court need 
not give any detailed explanation for its decision if the 
punitive damage award falls within this ratio range. If the 
award exceeds the ratios set by our past pattern of decision, 
the trial court is not bound to reduce it. However, if such 
an award is upheld, the trial judge must make a detailed and 
reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the 
award is not excessive in light of the law and the facts. 
The judge's articulation should generally be couched in terms 
of one or more of the seven factors we earlier listed as 
proper considerations in determining the amount of punitive 
damages, unless some other factor seems compelling to the 
trial court. For example, a trial court might conclude that 
an award should stand, despite a ratio that is higher than we 
have generally approved, because the defendant displayed an 
extremely high degree of malice, e.g., actual intent to 
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harm27 or a high degree of likelihood of great harm based 
on the reprehensible nature of the act.28 
In addition to articulating support for the amount 
of the award in terras of the relevant factors, the judge may 
also want to explain why the large ratio of punitives to 
actuals is necessary in the context of the particular case in 
order to further the purposes of punitive damages "by 
punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious_£iinduct [or 
conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others] which is not 
likely to be deterred by other means." Synergetics, 701 P.2d 
at 1112; see also Behrens v. Raleigh Hills HOSP,, 675 P.2d at 
1186. In sum, the trial judge's articulation should explain 
why the award is not excessive despite the fact that it 
exceeds the general pattern of awards upheld in our prior 
cases. The purpose of this requirement for an articulation 
of reasons warranting the denial of the rule 59(a)(5) 
excessiveness motion is to permit more effective and reasoned 
appellate review of the decision to uphold the award and to 
enable the appellate court to more carefully consider the 
various factors that may warrant punitives and the weight to 
be accorded them, while giving adequate deference to the 
advantaged position of the trial judge to appraise the 
witnesses and the evidence. Such appellate review will 
presumably lead to more substantive analysis of the punitive 
damage standards than has been heretofore possible• 
Should the trial court decide to either reduce or 
enlarge an award of punitive damages by way of remittitur or 
additur, it should also explain its action. See Saltas v. 
Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 1940) 
(requiring such an explanation when the trial court grants a 
new trial motion). Factors that may justify a remittitur 
could include the fact that the award exceeded the proper 
ratio, lack of intent or a low degree of malice, the benign 
nature of the act, the fact that a substantial portion of the 
actual damages is "soft," thus making the ratio analysis 
suspect,29 or a substantial risk of bankrupting the 
27. Sfifi, e,qt, Cox v. Stolworthv, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (Idaho 
1972) (exemplary damages in deceptive for-profit business 
scheme should make the cost of such repetitive antisocial 
conduct uneconomical), overruled in part, Cheney v. Palos 
Verdees Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661, 667 (Idaho 1983). 
28. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 
348, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding punitive award of 
$3.5 million for "conscious and callous disregard of public 
safety in order to maximize corporate profits"); Ford Motor 
Co. v. Havlick, 351 So. 2d 1050, 1050 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) 
(upholding award of $1,740,000 against Ford). 
29. Our past cases, taken together, also establish a 
distinction between "hard" and "soft" actual damages when used 
(Continued on page 32.) 
defendant. The articulation of grounds for a remittitur or 
an additur should serve the same purpose on appeal or where a 
motion for a new trial is denied. 
Returning to the present case, and applying the 
standards we articulate today, we conclude that we must 
vacate the denial of the motion for a new trial and remand 
the matter for reconsideration by the trial court in light of 
the foregoing discussion. At this time, we express no 
opinion as to whether a remittitur should be grarrfeed on 
remand. However, if one is again denied, the trial judge 
must explain the reasons for denial under the standards set 
forth above, given the large proportion of the compensatory 
damages arguably attributable to emotional distress or loss 
of financial reputation and the fact that the ratio of 
punitives to compensatories here appears to be much higher 
than in any case where we have upheld a punitive damage award. 
Finally, a review of our cases leads us to observe 
that a motion for a new trial challenging the amount of a 
punitive damage award is most appropriately brought under 
rule 59(a)(5), while a motion challenging an award of hard 
actual damages is more appropriately brought under rule 
59(a)(6). We note this because in reviewing damage awards in 
the past, this court has at times seemed to merge a rule 
59(a)(5) and (6) analysis. See generally Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985); Wellman v. 
Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
A challenge to the amount of an award of hard 
compensatory damages, which by definition are to compensate 
the plaintiff for some concrete loss, is most appropriately 
scrutinized within a 59(a)(6) framework because subsection 
(6) claims "[insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
(Footnote 29 continued.) 
as a basis in determining the appropriate amount of punitive 
damages. Where actual damages are largely "soft," this court 
has been reluctant to uphold punitive damage awards of a ratio 
that might survive scrutiny if the actual damages involved 
were "hard." Compare Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 
1985) M Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 
(Utah 1985) .aM Synergetics v, Marathon Ranching Co,, ht&,, 
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) and Bundv v. Century Eouip. Co., 692 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) M Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) a M Clavton v. Crossroads Eguio. Co., 
655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (all involving "hard- damages) with 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) and Cruz v. 
Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) and Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) and First Security 
Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1982) (all involving largely "soft" damages). 
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verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law" as 
ground upon which a new trial may be granted. Utah R. Civ, 
P. 59(a)(6). Generally, hard compensatory damages will be 
either supported by the evidence or not. 
While it may be appropriate generally to consider 
hard compensatory damages under subsection (6), the case may 
be different with soft compensatory damages, which constitute 
a majority of the compensatory damages awarded in this case. 
At times, those may more properly be addressed under the 
"passion or prejudice" framework of rule 59(a)(5). 
We note one final problem that could result from the 
standard we articulate today, which gives considerable 
deference to the trial court in passing on motions for new 
trials based on a claim of damage excessiveness. We do not 
wish to encourage parties who may try to bypass the trial 
court by appealing an excessive damage award directly without 
moving for a new trial and thus benefit from a less deferen-
tial standard on appeal. To avoid such an anomalous result, 
and because of the highly subjective nature of appraisal 
required in assessing the excessiveness of an award, we hold 
that any challenge to an award based on its excessiveness 
that is brought before an appellate court will be considered 
under the same standard articulated today for reviewing trial 
court decisions on motions for a new trial. If no new trial 
motion was filed below, we will assume that the trial court 
considered such a motion sua sponte under rule 59(d)30 and 
denied the motion. 
The course we take today should produce sounder 
decision making by trial and appellate courts. First, we 
plainly fix the primary responsibility of reviewing the 
amount of punitive damage awards on the court best equipped 
30. Rule 59(d) provides that "the court of its own volition 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have 
granted a new trial on motion of a party." Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(d). If no motion was filed below and the trial court did 
not grant a motion sua sponte, the effect is the same as if 
the trial court had considered and denied the motion. Thus, 
it is reasonable for us to apply the same standard of review 
for punitive damage awards whether they are on appeal from a 
trial court's refusal to grant a new trial or on direct 
appeal. We note, however, that we so hold with regard to 
punitives only because of the highly subjective nature of 
punitive damage awards. By so interpreting rule 59(d) with 
regard to punitive damage awards, we do not intend to imply 
that a similar interpretation of the rule will be given as it 
relates to other types of damages or to other grounds upon 
which new trials may be granted. 
to perform such a review—the trial court.31 We make it 
plain that the appellate court's role is to review the trial 
court's new trial ruling rather than the jury's verdict 
directly. Second, we give some context to the term 
"excessive" in rule 59(a)(5) through the imposition of an 
operatively presumptive ceiling, albeit a soft one. Finally, 
through the requirement of an articulation of reasons for 
sustaining or modifying damage awards, we establish a 
mechanism for the further development of the law_. The 
express consideration of the norms by which awardsr~are 
determined will promote careful review by both trial and 
appellate courts of the policies underlying punitive damages 
and the facts pertinent to a vindication of those policies on 
a case-by-case basis. See Report on Punitive Damages 13-15 
(advocating a flexible formula based on the amount of 
compensatory damages to determine the appropriate amount of 
punitive damages). A sounder law of punitive damages should 
result. 
The trial court's order denying the motion for a new 
trial on grounds that the punitive damage award was excessive 
is vacated, and the motion is remanded to the trial court for 
further consideration in light of this opinion. The judgment 
against Fire Insurance is affirmed in all other respects. 
31. Some may argue that allowing the trial court to consider 
in the first instance the propriety of the jury€s award of 
punitives and to reduce or increase the award if it deems 
appropriate violates the plaintiff's right to trial by jury. 
We certainly are not advocating that the trial court 
substitute wholesale its own judgment for that of the jury. 
See, e.g., Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 
185 (Utah 1990) (trial court has no discretion to grant new 
trial absent showing of at least one circumstance in rule 
59). Rather, we are recognizing that the trial judge is in a 
better position to determine in the first instance the 
appropriateness of the award. 
Our holding today in no way results in the loss of a 
plaintiff's right to a jury trial. A trial judge, in 
proposing a remittitur or additur, only does so as an 
alternative to granting a new trial. This is true because a 
trial judge may only remit the damages if he or she finds them 
excessive or add to them if he or she finds them 
inadequate—which is one of the grounds for granting a new 
trial. Thus, if a plaintiff does not want to accept the 
proposed remittitur, he or she may elect to retry the matter. 
In addition, as we have already pointed out, a trial 
judge may not substitute judgment for the jury. Rather, the 
judge must be able to articulate a reasonable basis for the 
inappropriateness of the verdict. Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 
2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Saltas v. Affleck. 99 Utah 381, 
105 P.2d 176 (1941). 
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WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (Concurring with Reservations) 
I concur.but write to express my reservation about 
some statements in the majority opinion as to when it is 
appropriate for the trial court to grant a new trial on the 
ground contained in Rule 59(a)(6), which is w [insufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law** I prefer not to express any opinion 
as to the law governing the granting of a new trial when the 
motion to grant is premised on that ground. This is because 
Fire Insurance, in its motion for a new trial, in its 
argument to the trial court at the hearing on its motion, and 
in its brief and argument to this court, has relied only on 
Rule 59(a)(5)/ which allows a new trial to be granted when 
there has been *[e]xcessive or inadequate damages, appearing 
to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice.* 
The majority opinion correctly states and applies 
the law governing this ground. We need not go further and 
attempt to restate the law governing other grounds for a new 
trial and examine, overrule, and criticize our cases arising 
under those grounds, especially in brief footnotes. 
I also refrain from expressing any opinion as to 
whether a motion for a new trial which challenges an award of 
"hard actual damages" is more appropriately brought under 
Rule 59(a)(6). In addition, I fail to see how an appellant 
could benefit by declining to move for a new trial but 
instead appealing directly an excessive damage award. In 
fact, there is an obvious disadvantage to that strategy. 
Therefore, I do not think we need assume that the trial court 
considered and denied a motion for a new trial sua soonte 
under Rule 59(d)• 
STEWART, Justice: (Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part) 
I agree with much of what the majority states about 
the standards to be employed under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah 
?s 
Rules of Civil Procedure, but I have reservations about 
several points in the opinion concerning the trial and 
appellate standards for dealing with motions for new trials, 
and I disagree with the ultimate disposition of the punitive 
damages issue, I concur in all other parts of the opinion. 
The sole issue raised on appeal in this case with 
respect to the award of punitive damages is that they were 
"excessive" under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 59(a) specifies seven grounds for^ranting a 
new trial by a trial court. Subpart (5) provides that a trial 
court may order a new trial if it finds that the jury returned 
"excessive or inadequate damages" that appear "to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." The 
majority uses that contention of error as a springboard to 
launch into a sweeping, and in some instances confusing, 
discussion of the operation of Rule 59(a). In parts of the 
discussion, it appears that the majority is defining standards 
for all of Rule 59(a), but in other parts the majority seems 
to address issues that arise only under subparts (5) and (6), 
although the latter subpart is not before the Court and has 
not been argued by the parties. 
I think it appropriate to note that although a 
verdict may be supported by some evidence, the trial court may 
set that verdict aside under subpart (6) if the verdict is 
against the manifest weight of the evidence so "that the trial 
judge 'cannot in good conscience permit it to stand.1" 
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (quoting 
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (1958) 
(Crockett, J., concurring)). See also Brown v. Johnson, 24 
Utah 2d 388, 391, 472 P.2d 942, 944 (1970); Hyland v. St. 
Mark's HOSP., 19 Utah 2d 134, 137, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967); 
Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 380, 412 P.2d 
615, 617-18 (1966); Kino v. Union Pacific R.R., 117 Utah 40, 
45-49, 212 P.2d 692, 695-96 (1949); 6A J. Moore & J. Lucas, 
Moore's Federal Practice if 59.08[53 (1991). in Goddard Vt 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984), and Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), we held that the standard of review on 
appeal of an order granting a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) is 
that the order will be sustained "if the record contains 
•substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict 
for the [moving party].'n 657 P.2d at 732 (quoting King v. 
Union Pacific R.R., 117 Utah at 53, 212 P.2d at 698). 
In dealing with the standard of review that an 
appellate court should utilize in reviewing a trial court's 
grant of a motion for a new trial, the majority states that 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 
(Utah 1985), is a case that has contributed to confusion with 
respect to the proper standard because that case stated that a 
"reviewing court will defer to a jury's damage award unless 
the award indicates that the jury disregarded competent 
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evidence . . . .w 701 P.2d at 1084. The majority then 
asserts that if that statement purports to state the standard 
of review by which an appellate court determines the propriety 
of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial, it 
is incorrect. The majority further states: 
The statement can be read to mean that this 
court reviews the jury's action directly, 
when in reality we review the trial court's 
action for an abuse of discretion* It is 
this type of loosely worded standard which 
has, over time, effectively confused the 
appellate court's proper role in assessing 
the merits of a rule 59 motion attacking a 
jury verdict with that of the trial judge. 
Ma j . op. at 21 (citation omitted). 
The confusion that the majority finds is based on its 
misreading of Bennion. There was no issue of the propriety of 
the grant or denial of a new trial motion in Bennion.-*- This 
Court was simply asked to review directly the validity of the 
award of damages. Although Rule 59(a) was argued by the 
appellant in Bennion as if it established standards for 
reversing a verdict on appeal, there was no motion for a new 
trial made in the trial court, and the issue before this Court 
was the standard for reviewing a damage award directly on 
appeal. In short, the majority's loose analysis is used to 
argue that it is necessary to restate our case law because it 
is inaccurate. I disagree. 
Indeed, the majority contrives a strange, hypothetical 
procedure to justify an inappropriate standard of appellate 
review of punitive damage awards not reviewed by the trial 
court on a motion for a new trial. The majority states that in 
cases in which a motion for a new trial is not made and an 
appeal is taken directly from the award of punitive damages, an 
appellate court will assume that the trial court sua sponte 
considered and denied a hypothetical motion. This hypothetical 
motion and ruling is then made the basis for applying the same 
standard of review in direct appellate review of an award of 
punitive damages as is applied when a motion for a new trial is 
actually made and denied by the trial court and that ruling is 
then appealed. Such an approach is unnecessary and if 
literally applied would lead to serious difficulties. After 
assuming the hypothetical motion and a ruling by the trial 
court denying it, an appellate court must then, according to 
1. Although the majority notes this distinction in footnote 
21, it does not explain how Bennion could be misread as to the 
proper standard of review when considering the denial or grant 
of a motion for a new trial when no such issue was before the 
Court, 
the majority, determine if the trial court would have abused 
its discretion in denying the hypothetical motion. 
Clearly, the proper approach is for an appellate court 
to review the award of punitive damages straight-out in light 
of the various factors set out in the majority opinion for 
determining the reasonableness of punitive damages. Compare 
Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1084, which states that to justify a new 
trial for excessive damages under Rule 59(a)(5), the damage 
award must be "clearly excessive on any rational view of the 
evidence." Although that statement was not made in the context 
of a punitive damage award, it is an appropriate standard to be 
applied in light of the six relevant factors referred to by the 
majority to be considered in determining the validity of a 
punitive damage award. Applying usual appellate standards to 
the review of a punitive damage award is altogether sound. 
There is no reason to devise a fictional procedure to justify 
an unnecessary and inappropriate result. Given the 
difficulties, it is important to recognize that the majority's 
view is strictly dictum. There was in fact a motion for a new 
trial in this case. 
The majority remands this case to the trial court for 
the trial judge to state his reasons for sustaining the award 
of punitive damages. In explaining the factors the trial judge 
may examine, the majority opinion, in my view, unduly 
emphasizes the relationship of the punitive damages to 
compensatory damages. That relationship is certainly not 
determinative, but is only one of many factors to be 
considered. In the context of this case, it is significant 
that our prior cases have not dealt with punitive damages 
awarded against a multi-million dollar corporation. Of greater 
significance than the relationship of the punitive and 
compensatory damage awards are the other factors which have 
been enumerated in our cases, such as the financial resources 
of the defendant and the likelihood that a defendant will 
continue its malicious conduct. 
The defendant in this case argues that its net income 
for the year of its misconduct was $23,000,000 and that a 
$4,000,000 punitive damage award is exceptionally high compared 
to its net income. The defendant does not state, however, that 
the company's total assets are $723,468,116. Furthermore, the 
evidence disclosed that there are four claims offices in Utah, 
each handling four to five thousand claims per year. In 
addition, scores of other offices located in the western United 
States handle a similar number of claims. The defendant stated 
at trial that the practices which it employed in this case were 
sound business practices- Indeed, three of the defendant's 
employees who testified at trial for the defendant stated that 
they believed they had treated the Crookstons fairly. The 
claims adjuster who committed the fraud, Clapperton, stated 
that he felt good about what he did to the Crookstons. His 
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record for improving company profits has apparently not been 
overlooked in the corporation, because the defendant has twice 
promoted him since his adjustment of the Crookston loss. He is 
now the district claims manager supervising the adjustment of 
all claims in northern Utah, 
From the defendant's point of view, it certainly can 
be argued that $4,000,000 punitive damages is excessive. 
However, from a public policy point of view, the award is 
justified. In the absence of punitive damages, th%-defendant 
may well find that it is profitable to continue its illegal 
conduct even though it may incur the cost of compensatory 
damages from time to time. One may never know how many of the 
thousands of claims handled in Utah and elsewhere by the 
defendant have been subjected to the same kind of fraudulent 
manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses 
to those who contracted in good faith. A $4,000,000 punitive 
damage award can certainly have a salubrious effect in inducing 
the defendant to bring its practices into harmony with common 
moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say nothing of 
the requirements of the law. 
All this, and much more justifying the punitive damage 
award, is on record in this case. The issue was well-tried, 
and the trial judge set out his views with some clarity, 
although not with as much detail as the majority opinion 
requires. In my view, since the relevant evidence is before 
the Court and is sufficient to justify the award of punitive 
damages, given the presumption of correctness that ought to 
attach to the jury verdict, I would affirm the award and not 
remand for further proceedings. 
Finally, I agree that, as a general proposition, 
requiring an articulation of the reasons for the granting of a 
new trial by a trial court is sound policy. This Court said as 
much in Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 
178 (1940). However, I think the rules which require trial 
judges to explain the reasons for granting or not granting a 
motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive punitive 
damages should be expanded to awards that are within the 
three-to-one ratio that the Court suggests presumptively 
establishes reasonableness. A three-to-one punitive damage 
award may, however, be devastating for an individual or 
business entity with limited financial resources. I think all 
punitive damage awards by a jury should be justified by the 
trial court when there is a motion for a new trial based on the 
ground of excessive punitive damages. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial 
judge's denial of a new trial without further proceedings. I 
also concur in the reservations expressed in Justice Howe's 
opinion. 
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